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Abstract 
This paper uses Plan-InM household survey data on the participants of 
Plan Bangladesh Funded Flexible Microfinance Services. The analysis 
suggests that the extreme poor households who may have likelihood to 
be self excluded from the financial services have a significant higher 
preference or demand for flexible saving services. The migrant 
households have a positive significant demand for flexible saving services. 
But the demand for flexible saving service is inversely related to the 
households’ food vulnerability and unexpected financial crisis, such as 
loss in income due to injury of household members, price hike, etc.  
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Introduction 
 
The Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) of Bangladesh have attained a reputation in the globe 
for their success in delivering the microcredit facilities to the rural poor, and making micro 
credit recognized as one of the dominating anti-poverty alleviating interventions. Micro 
credit has created opportunities for the millions of poor to alleviate their poverty level. It is 
well established in the literature that micro credit makes positive impact on different 
outcomes – savings, wealth accumulation, net-worth, employment and vulnerability 
minimization (for example, Khandker; Khandker et. al.; Hulme and Mosley; Matin; Zohir et. 
al., Khalily et. al.). The access to microcredit program has created the other dimension of 
access such as access to insurance services, saving services, risk fund services, etc., as 
nowadays microfinance program is an integrated programs. This program has become 
successful in ameliorating the aggregate household well-being such as increases the income 
                                                            
1 Md. Abdul Khaleque, Senior Research Associate, Institute of Microfinance (InM), Plot-E/4, PKSF Bhaban, 
Agargaon Administrative Area, Dhaka-1207.  
from self-employment as well as income from wage-based activity like farm-wage income as 
the spillover effect causes a rise in village level wage rate (Khandker, Khalily, Khan; 
Khandker).  Many of the poor households are now being covered under the microfinance 
program and the benefits from this program is widespread across the nation.  
The profound dependency on lending to assist the poor represents a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the demand for financial services.  There is evidence that some of the 
poor can make profitable use of loans to augment physical capital and expand and begin 
enterprises in the traditional investment pathway through which financial services help 
reduce poverty.  But a larger number of poor people have greater demands for other types 
of services like savings, insurance, etc.  The poorer the household, the more important are 
non-lending services to assure food security, smooth consumption, manage risks, reduce 
vulnerability and meet other basic needs (Rutherford, 2000; Sebstad and Cohen, 2001; 
World Bank, 2001; Zeller, et al., 1997).    
The microcredit has succeeded in reaching its pinnacle by covering the large number of the 
upper level poor group of Bangladesh. The marginal success of the microfinance program, 
therefore, was tremendous at the early era of microfinance revolution, but the marginal 
success in terms of coverage seems to be in near stagnation. The research finding suggests 
that only 24% of the services of the microfinance institutions go toward the extreme poor2. 
This situation is mainly because some of the poor are yet out of financial services; such poor 
are predominantly belonged to the extreme vulnerable or ultra poor group who are 
financially excluded either by self-exclusion or institution. Most of the extreme poor 
voluntarily excluded from the services or sometimes the institution excludes these groups 
due to high risk of default. However, many of these extreme poor people have unmet 
demand for other arrays of financial services like innovative savings and credit services, 
insurance, leasing, pawn, and mortgages to meet emergencies and distress situations. Since 
most NGOs have not diversified their products to meet these demands, some new products 
should be developed in an innovative way to motivate the ultra poor household to 
participate the financial services so that they become eligible for formal access. 
                                                            
2  Adopted from Rahman, Hossain Zillur “Bangladesh: Dynamics of Rural Poverty”, Paper presented 
International Conference on Poverty, 9-11 February 1998, Dhaka, Bangladesh.  
Two critical elements are required to get out of poverty – human capital and financial capital 
development. Since creation of human capital is a long run and continuous process, the 
financial capital development, particularly of the poor households, can be ensured through 
access to credit, access to saving, then investment opportunity and thereby reducing the 
poverty gap.  
“The poor cannot save” is one of the prominent hypotheses before exploring the 
microfinance program in Bangladesh. The traditional microfinance institution offered a 
constant weekly saving scheme and part of which was forced and part of which was 
voluntary. Albeit the design of saving service includes the voluntary as well as forced system, 
the weekly features excludes some of the poor households from the saving services and then 
from the credit services as credit services is built in saving services3 to a great extent. Wright 
(2000) argued that product design is one of the most important factors affecting 
participation. In addition to the evidence presented in the Hashemi study, he cited a study 
by Alamghir (1997) who found that about twenty-five percent of non-participants did not 
join because they were unable to make weekly savings installments, about 15 percent could 
not make weekly loan installments, seven percent were not interested in getting a loan, and 
another seven percent did not want to attend weekly meetings.  Wright (2000) reported that 
many of the BRAC member dropouts from the BRAC program which is almost over 15 
percent of its membership in 1992 and almost 11 percent the next year.  By analyzing those 
dropouts, they come to a conclusion that BRAC was losing many of its older, experienced 
and more cost-effective clients due to the inflexibility of the BRAC model, especially the 
lack of access to savings in times of emergency.  Strict rules governing savings deposits and 
withdrawals suggest that members perceive that compulsory savings are an additional cost 
of borrowing (Montgomery, et al., 1996).  At the end of 1995, Grameen experienced an 
unusual repayment problem because of a widespread strike among clients in Tangail who 
demanded access to their compulsory group savings funds.  Before the strike was settled 
and Grameen provided greater access to savings, some 60,000 borrowers with payments 
more than 25 weeks overdue had an unpaid amount of over Tk. 82 million or US$2 million 
(Wright, 1999).     
 
                                                            
3 The households have to save certain of amount of savings to get credit.  
This paper aims at to search the following questions: (I). “If there is a provision of flexibility 
in depositing any amount of savings, does the amount of savings increase for those who 
have such facility than the others who have no access to such facility?”  (II). Does the 
extreme poor or ultra poor households have high preference for flexible saving services 
compared to moderate poor or non-poor households?  
 
Counterfactual Agents and Demand Identification 
 
The present study is based on the observations of counterfactual agents of the participants 
of flexible service program. The households who prefer the flexible saving services, 
counterfactually they dislike the inflexible saving services, that is, if the participant 
households which like or demand the flexible saving services, would dislike the traditional 
forced and inflexible saving services or would voluntarily exclude themselves from the 
program or would drop out from the program in the immediate future. On the other hand, 
the households which do not prefer the flexible saving program or remain indifference 
between the two programs – flexible saving services versus inflexible saving services, 
counterfactually represents those households who do not have demand for such services, 
albeit they are the participants of the flexible microfinance modality4 . Counterfactually, 
inflexibility is the price of flexible saving services, that is, if the flexibilities of the flexible 
saving services were increased, the demand for the program would decline. In the present 
case, the demand for flexible services is discrete, representing by the dummy variable 
containing the value 1 if the households prefer the flexible saving services and 0 otherwise. 
The current model, therefore, is estimated independent of price as all the households are the 
participants of the flexible microfinance services. 
 
Data  
 
Under the support of Plan Bangladesh, ComeToSave (CTS) is working with its 10 branches 
at Chirirbandar and Khansama Upazila of Dinajpur district. It has covered 23 villages in 
                                                            
4 The flexible microfinance modality is a combination of various flexible services such as flexibility in loan 
repayment, saving services like depositing or withdrawing savings from their account.  
Chirirbandar and 30 villages in Khansama mobilized 21170 beneficiaries in aggregate. 
People’s Oriented Program Implementation (POPI) under Plan’s flexible microfinance 
program is working with 7 branches in Hatibandha Upazila of Lalmonirhat and Jaldhaka 
Upazila of Nilphamari. It has brought 21 villages in Hatibandha and 17 villages in Jaldhaka 
under the program, and mobilized about 10,984 beneficiaries in Hatibandha and 7862 
beneficiaries in Jaldhaka by the end of first quarter of 2010. Therefore, under Plan program, 
CTS and POPI together have been providing flexible financial services to about 40,016 
beneficiaries through 17 branches. 
 
The proportion of branches of CTS and POPI is 10:7 which implies that approximately 60 
percent of 17 branches were operated by CTS and 40 percent were operated by POPI. 
Therefore, in drawing sample the numbers of branches covered by the Plan’s Partner were 
considered. Ten branches out of 17 branches were randomly selected on proportional basis. 
Four branches from POPI and six branches from CTS were selected. Of the selected 10 
branches, 2 villages from each were randomly picked up. From each sample village, we 
randomly selected 30 members. Therefore, we selected 600 sample members from the 
treatment villages, of them 360 samples were drawn from CTS villages and 240 samples 
from POPI villages 
 
Background of Flexible Saving Services   
 
Both microeconomic and macroeconomic view suggests that savings and investment 
follows an identity, that is, the amount invested is equal to amount saved and this happens 
only through saving mobilization. But the extreme poor should have first the access to 
saving program and which help them to form financial capital. But since the inception of 
microcredit program, savings services have been ignored relative to credit by the entire 
microfinance industry, this problem was acute for extreme poor.  An experimental project 
implemented by SafeSave since 1996 in the slums of Dhaka demonstrates that strong 
demand exists for voluntary open-access savings among the very poor or ultra poor; and 
they are motivated and capable of saving when offered attractive, convenient and flexible 
savings and credit services.  SafeSave collectors travel daily throughout the slums to call on 
clients who have the choice of making deposits of any size that day or waiting until another 
day.  Withdrawals are available upon demand from current accounts.  Contractual savings 
products and loans are also offered.  Clients earn the automatic right to borrow an amount 
equal to their current savings balances plus a future amount that grows with each loan 
repayment (Matin, Rutherford, and Maniruzzaman, 2000). Loans can be paid back at any 
time but the interest charges of three percent per month calculated on the declining balance 
must be paid monthly, and there is no joint liability.  Loan recovery has been satisfactory in 
spite of insecure tenure slum clearances and fires.  The number of clients and volume of 
savings mobilized and loans outstanding have grown steadily (SafeSave, 2000). An 
experiment will be undertaken to determine if this type of program can be successfully 
replicated in rural areas where there is more seasonality and lower population density.  By 
comparison, most MFIs require all clients to save fixed amounts on a weekly basis, and 
savers cannot access their compulsory savings until they repay their loans and discontinue 
their membership.  The large MFIs have viewed compulsory savings as a means to fund 
their loan portfolios and provide a lump sum pension when the clients leave the 
organization (Zaman, 1999).  Some MFIs require group savings that are managed by the 
group and can be lent to group members or used for emergencies.  Access to compulsory 
savings has been a contentious issue and has caused strikes and ill will between clients and 
MFIs.  BURO Tangail is one of the few MFIs that stresses voluntary savings and was one of 
the first to offer “associate member” status to those who want to save and not borrow. The 
research reported here clearly suggests that clients demand a greater variety of and more 
flexible financial products than is typically offered by most MFIs, but it is not a trivial matter 
for MFIs to supply them, as described in the well-documented attempt by ASA to offer 
more flexible savings services (Wright, Christen, and Matin, 2001).20 In 1997, ASA followed 
the example of Grameen and BRAC and began to offer voluntary savings products.  ASA’s 
chief objective was to continue to disburse and recover small loans in an efficient manner, 
especially to women, but voluntary savings were seen as an excellent way to access relatively 
cheap capital, increase outreach and loan volume, maintain portfolio quality, increase 
productivity, and reduce poverty and vulnerability.21 
 
 
 
Features of Flexible Savings Program: 
 
There is no ceiling on the amount of savings deposit. Savers can save any amount any 
number of times during a month and any amount5. This flexibility can be implemented 
because collector (generally community worker appointed from the community) moves to 
every HH (Household) every day to collect deposits. No group meeting is held to collect 
deposits. Collector record the amount of deposit in the Pass Book held by the savers. No 
service charge is imposed to open a saving account. However, a nominal fee of Taka 20 is 
charged for closing any deposit account.  
 
Savers can withdraw maximum of Taka 200 from the collectors in their own village. But 
withdrawing beyond Tk. 200 requires savers to withdraw from the branch office. This kind 
of transactions takes place in 24 hours. Depositors are paid an interest rate of six percent on 
their net deposits.  
 
Set of Hypothesis 
The present studies aims to test the following hypotheses:  
(a) The extreme poor like moderate poor or non-poor do have demand for flexible 
saving services. 
(b) The off-farm employers have demand for flexible saving services compared to farm 
employers.  
(c) The financial shocks or vulnerability have no effects on demand for flexible saving 
services.  
 
Methodology 
 
Probit is a popular binary or discrete outcome or qualitative response model. In discrete 
outcome or qualitative response models for a dependent variable that indicates m mutually 
exclusive categories of the outcome of interests.  
 
                                                            
5 The savers can save even a 1 taka a day (1.43 cents) 
For binary outcome data the dependent variable ࢟ takes one of two values. We let: 
࢟ ൌ ൤
૚             ݓ݅ݐ݄ ݌ݎ݋ܾܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ ݌
 ૙  ݓ݅ݐ݄ ݌ݎ݋ܾܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ      
A regression model is formed parameterizing the probability p to depend on a regressor 
vector ࢄ and a ܭ ൈ 1  parameter vector ࢼ. The commonly used models are of single-index 
form with conditional probability given by ݌௜ ൌ Prሾݕ௜ ൌ 1|ܺሿ ൌ ܨ൫ݔ௜′ߚ൯; here ܨሺ. ሻ is a 
specified function. To ensure that 0 ൑ ݌ ൑ 1 it is natural to specify ܨሺ. ሻ to be a cumulative 
distribution function. 
 
The probit model specifies the conditional probability: ݌ ൌ Φሺݔ ′ߚሻ ൌ ׬ ߶ሺݖሻ݀ݖ
௫′ఉ
ି∞ ; here 
Φሺ. ሻ  is the standard normal cdf (cumulative density function), with derivative ߶ሺݖሻ ൌ
൫1/√2ߨ൯exp ቀെ
௭మ
ଶ
ቁ, which is the standard normal density function.  
 
The probit maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) first – order conditions are that 
∑ ݓ௜ ቀݕ௜ െΦ൫ݔ௜′ߚ൯ቁ ݔ௜ ൌ 0;ே௜ୀଵ here, ݓ௜  is the weight which is defined as ݓ௜ ൌ
߶൫ݔ௜
′ߚ൯/ൣΦ൫ݔ௜′ߚ൯ െ ሺ1 െΦ൫ݔ௜′ߚ൯൧ varies across observations. The probit model marginal 
effects are డ௣೔
డ௫೔ೕ
ൌ ߶൫ݔ௜
′ߚ൯ߚ௝ ൌ ߶ሺΦିଵሺ݌௜ሻሻߚ௝ , where݌௜ ൌ Φ൫ݔ௜′ߚ൯.  
 
In our analysis, we have used probit for discrete variables 6 . In the index function 
formulation interest lies in explaining an underlying unobserved preference toward flexible 
saving program ݕכ, but all we observe is the binary variable ݕ, which takes value 1 or 0 
according to whether  or not  ݕכ crosses a threshold.  
 
Let ݕכ be a latent or unobserved variable such as the desire to save or propensity to save 
under flexible saving program. The natural regression model for  ݕכ is the index function 
model: 
                                                            
6 A latent variable is a variable that is incompletely observed. Latent variables can be introduced into binary 
outcome models in two different ways. In the first the latent variable is an index of an unobserved propensity 
for the event of interest to occur. In the second the latent variable is the difference in utility that occurs if the 
event of interest occurs, which presumes that the binary outcome is a result of individual choice.   
 
ݕכ ൌ ܺ ′ߚ ൅ ݑ 
However, this model can’t be estimated as ݕכ is not observed. Instead, we observe: 
ݕ ൌ ൜
1 ݂݅ ݕכ ݎ݁ݏ݌݋݊ݏ݁ ݌݋ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݈݁ݕ
0 ݂݅ ݕכ ݎ݁ݏ݌݋݊ݏ݁ ݊݁݃ܽݐ݅ݒ݈݁ݕ 
Here the threshold of zero is a normalization explained in the following. 
Prሾݕ ൌ 1|ܺሿ ൌ Prሾݕכ ൐ 0ሿ ൌ Prሾܺ ′ߚ ൅ ݑ ൐ 0ሿ ൌ Prሾെݑ ൐ ܺ ′ߚሿ ൌ ܨሺܺ ′ߚሻ 
Here F is the cdf of (- u), which equals the cdf of u in the usual case of density symmetric 
about zero. The probit model will arise if the error u is standard normal distribution.  
 
Who demands the flexible saving service and why? 
 
The demand for flexible saving service depends on various factors, such as the overall well-
being of the household (poverty status), the income source (remittance), the vulnerability to 
food deficiency or risks like natural shocks or financial shock, etc. We observed that about 
17% of the sample households were extreme or ultra poor who joined the flexible 
microfinance program. Almost 67% of the sample household demands for flexible saving 
services, and 12% faces an unanticipated or unexpected financial crisis, such injury of 
earning member and thereof reduction in income. Since the objectives of the flexible 
microfinance program supported by Plan Bangladesh was to reach the poor, especially 
extreme poor, we find that about 44% households were affected by seasonal food 
deficiency. So the present study focuses the demand for flexible saving services of the 
vulnerable to food and risk nested ultra poor households. 
 
Empirically, we have found that inflexible microfinance services, specially, inflexible saving 
services were one of the major causes of membership dropout. Now, we should test this 
hypothesis assessing the demand-driven flexible saving services. Since we are aiming at to 
assess the demand for flexible saving services, we are simply dealing with a single controlled 
variable, but a set of control variables is being used for proper assessing the demand causal 
factors. To find the factors affecting the demand for flexible saving services compared to 
inflexible saving services, we have incorporated the percentage of household members who 
are educated, the log of annual income, food vulnerability of the household, risks, dummy 
for the remitter households, dummy for the extreme poor households and occupation of the 
household head as explanatory to assess the demand for flexible saving services.   
 
Table 1: Probit and Logit results of demand for flexible savings 
 Probit Logit 
% of family member educated 0.003* 0.006* 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Log of annual income -0.073 -0.124 
 (0.077) (0.131) 
Vulnerability of Shock to Food -0.330*** -0.546*** 
 (0.113) (0.186) 
Financial shock -0.476*** -0.782*** 
 (0.167) (0.271) 
Natural shock 0.055 0.079 
 (0.114) (0.189) 
Migrate: Yes = 1, No=0 0.341* 0.553 
 (0.198) (0.347) 
Employment in non-agriculture -0.047 -0.078 
 (0.113) (0.187) 
Extreme poor household 0.424** 0.698** 
 (0.171) (0.299) 
Constant 1.169 1.966 
 (0.846) (1.447) 
Number of observations 584 584 
Log-Likelihood -352.09 -352.20 
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.050 
    Note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
 
The probit result suggests that the extreme poor have a significant demand for flexible 
saving services. The result shows that the extreme poor have the higher probability to 
choose the flexible saving services compared to the moderate poor or non-poor. The odd 
ratio of extreme poor household calculated by logit model explains that the odds of 
demanding flexible saving services increases by a factor of 2.01, holding all other 
explanatory variables constant. The result we have obtained is logical and plausible, because 
the extreme poor do not have smooth consumption and smooth income and so the timely 
saving scheme does not encourage them to be participant of the saving program and 
voluntarily exclude themselves from the financial services like savings, credit, insurance, etc. 
But the provision of flexible saving services allures them to be the participant of the saving 
program and ensures the financial access of them.  
 
To find the demand for flexible saving services across different occupation, we have 
included the dummy for employment which is equal to 1 for the households whose head is 
employed in non-agriculture. Our postulation was that among the non-agriculture 
employees the likelihood to prefer flexible saving program is lower than the employees who 
are engaged in agriculture. Our result supports the sign of the hypothesis, but this relation is 
not statistically significant. We also postulate that the poor households who are employed in 
non-agriculture have a positive preference for flexible saving services. This sign of the 
postulation is satisfied but again this is not statistically significant. 
 
The dummy for migration is included in the demand function for the flexible saving 
program to identify the causality of irregular flow of income and demand for flexible saving. 
The poor households, who migrate, send their remittance with irregular interval. Such 
irregular interval of sending money is not suitable for savings of fixed interval such as 
weekly savings. Our result reveals that the migrant households prefers the flexibility in 
saving program to specific fixed interval approach more than the non-migrant households.  
 
The economics of savings tells that the saving decision is independent of flexibility for the 
higher income bracket households. This is because the constant flow of income enables the 
household to save a certain amount of saving if the household desires to save and face no 
obstacles in the process of saving decision. The coefficient of log of annual income of both 
models is negative and insignificant; in spite we observe a direction of income increase and 
demand for flexible saving services. The logit result shows that for a standard deviation 
increase in the log of the household annual income, the odds of demanding flexible saving 
services are 0.88 times lower, holding all other variables constant (cetirus peribus).  
 The inauguration of flexible saving services is sometimes incapable of save augmenting 
inducement of some households who are extremely vulnerable to food deprivation and 
affected by the financial shock like unanticipated loss in income due to injury of household 
members, unexpected price hike, etc. The households which have high likelihood to food 
vulnerability, they are less likely to save even if flexible saving service is being ensured, 
because they try to reduce their food vulnerability spending almost the entire income on 
food. Hence the food vulnerable and unexpected financial shocks do not demand for saving 
services – whether the saving service is flexible of inflexible. The probit result reveals that 
the demand for flexible saving service is inversely related to food vulnerability and financial 
vulnerability and this relation is statistically significant at 1 percent level.  
 
Conclusion 
 
To bring the ultra poor under the access of financial services tree, products should be 
designed in such a way that it follows the life-cycle of the ultra poor. The flexibility in saving 
services is expected to bring the extreme or ultra poor people under the financially served 
people. Such changes required for the microfinance industry to better serve its clients of all 
types – extreme poor, moderate poor or non-poor. The microfinance providers must 
formulate their new products and policies in such a way that these are opting for 
implementations and simple for implementations. The trade-off between product flexibility 
and client satisfaction, on the one hand, and costs and risk for the MFIs, on the other, must 
be recognized and managed during implementing such program.  The pressures to do a 
better job of serving the very poor complicates the task and the historical belief that the 
poor need externally imposed discipline to encourage them to save discourages attempts to 
provide the poor with the very financial service that may be most valuable.  The MFIs in 
Bangladesh – the motherland of microfinance – have enjoyed a worldwide reputation as 
leaders in the microfinance industry.  They are now being challenged to demonstrate that 
they can successfully move into the next phase of supplying demand-driven flexible financial 
services.   
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics  
Variables  Mean SD 
Extreme poor 0.17 0.37 
Vulnerability of Shock to Food 0.44 0.50 
Prefer flexible saving?  0.67 0.47 
% of family member educated 53.76 29.60 
Log of annual income 11.01 0.81 
Financial shock 0.12 0.33 
Natural shock 0.42 0.49 
Migration 0.12 0.33 
Household head employed in 
non-agriculture 
0.41 0.49 
Head of extreme household 
employed in non-agriculture 
0.05 0.22 
 
Figure 1: Predicted Probabilities of Probit Regression 
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Table 2: Coefficients and the odd ratio 
Can save any amount? b Z P>z e^b e^bStdX SDofX e^b e^bStdX SDofX 
    Factor change in odds Factor change in odds: reverse 
% of member educated  0.01 1.76 0.08 1.01 1.18 29.60 0.99 0.85 29.60
Log of annual income -0.12 -0.94 0.35 0.88 0.90 0.81 1.13 1.11 0.81
Food vulnerability -0.55 -2.93 0.00 0.58 0.76 0.50 1.73 1.31 0.50
Financial shock -0.78 -2.89 0.00 0.46 0.77 0.33 2.19 1.29 0.33
Natural shock 0.08 0.42 0.68 1.08 1.04 0.49 0.92 0.96 0.49
Migrate  0.55 1.59 0.11 1.74 1.20 0.33 0.58 0.83 0.33
Head employed in non-
agriculture 
-0.08 -0.42 0.68 0.92 0.96 0.49 1.08 1.04 0.49
Extreme poor  0.70 2.34 0.02 2.01 1.30 0.37 0.50 0.77 0.37
    
b            = raw coefficient 
z            = z-score for the test of b = 0 
p>|z|  = p-value for z-test 
e^b  = exp(b) = Factor change in odds for unit increase in X 
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Appendix 
Plan Bangladesh and Flexible Saving Program 
Plan Bangladesh implements program through its partners under Family Economic Security 
(FES) Program in the line with Plan’s core approach called Child Centered Community 
Development Approach (CCCD). Plan provides financial and technical supports to partner 
MFIs to work with the extreme people through financial innovation in a sustainable manner. 
Currently, four MF core partners (SafeSave, CTS, DKS and POPI) of Plan Bangladesh are 
working in urban and rural area. Plan also provides technical support to a local NGO called 
Ashrai to provide microfinance to tribal people in the rural area. Plan has identified SafeSave 
approach as core model for partners to adapt in the rural area of Northern Bangladesh 
through intensive and well designed action research framework.  
Financial Services for the Extreme Poor and the poor – Plan Microfinance model: 
“Reaching the poor, especially the extreme poor through microfinance innovation and pro-
poor financial institution development” is the code aspect of Plan Bangladesh’s 
microfinance strategy. Plan supported financial services (savings and loan) are demand 
driven and are designed to serve the poor, especially extreme poor through participatory 
product development processes where community and the organization identify and design 
the financial products through participatory market research. For this seasonality of food 
availability, income and vulnerability factors have been studied in-depth through interaction 
with the community. The products are delivered to the individual households on a daily 
basis by a collector selected by the community and recruited by implementing partner. The 
individual approach has been taken by Plan to address the issue of social exclusion, fragile 
source of income, low income and joint liability for which the poorest household have 
always been excluded by the traditional MF. All children, men and women have access to 
become clients. However, special attention is given to attract more women to increase their 
access to financial asset and to improve impact on their empowerment process.  
Increasing and deepening outreach 
During the last CSP period, Plan and its partners experimented different product 
innovations and tried out types of delivery mechanisms to reach the extreme poor and poor 
effectively. The tireless experimentation and piloting has provided Plan and its partners to 
identify best possible mechanisms to reach the extreme poor and poor. However, the 
approach and current innovation is not static and Plan and its partners will continue to 
strive to improve its operation and development through action research and learning. 
During this CSP period, Plan’s microfinance partner organization will continue its special 
drive to serve the extreme poor. At the same time, they will put its effort to increase 
outreach and provide sustainable financial services to more poor, especially extreme poor 
with high level of efficiency.  
